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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new measure of how close a set of choices are to satisfying the
observable implications of rational choice, and apply it to a large balanced panel of household
level consumption data. We use this method to answer three related questions: (i) "How close
are individual consumption choices to satisfying the model of utility maximization?" (ii) "Are
there di⁄erences in rationality between di⁄erent demographic groups?" (iii) "Can choices be
aggregated across individuals under the assumption of homogeneous preferences?" Crucially,
in answering these questions, we take into account the power of budget sets faced by each
household to expose failures of rationality. To summarize our results we ￿nd that: (i) while
observed violations of rationality are small in absolute terms, our households are only moderately
more rational than the benchmark of random choice; (ii) there are signi￿cant di⁄erences in
the rationality of di⁄erent groups, with multi-head households more rational than single head
households, and the youngest households more rational than middle age households; (iii) the
assumption of homogenous preferences is strongly rejected: choice data that is aggregated across
households exhibits high levels of irrationality.
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11 Introduction
Arguably the most pervasive assumption in economics is that agents are ￿ rational￿in the sense
that they make choices as if they are maximizing some stable underlying utility function. Since
the work of Samuelson [1938] and Houthakker [1950], the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a
data set to be consistent with utility maximization have been well known: the preference relations
revealed by choice must be acyclic. This condition is; however, a very demanding one. A single
inconsistent choice is enough for an individual to be classi￿ed as irrational, even if most of their
choices are consistent with rationality. In practice, individuals appear to exhibit some irrationality
in almost every data set ￿from the laboratory or from the ￿eld.1 This has lead to a concerted
e⁄ort to ￿nd measures of ￿ goodness of ￿t￿for the assumption of utility maximization.2
In this paper, we develop a novel goodness of ￿t measure for the assumption of rationality,3
and apply it to a large balanced panel of household level consumption data. We use this method
to answer three related questions: (i) ￿How close are individual consumption choices to satisfying
the model of utility maximization?￿ (ii) ￿Are there di⁄erences in rationality between di⁄erent
demographic groups?￿(iii) ￿Can choices be aggregated across individuals under the assumption of
homogeneous preferences?￿Crucially, in answering these questions, we take into account the power
of budget sets faced by each household to expose failures of rationality. To summarize our results
we ￿nd that: (i) while observed violations of rationality are small in absolute terms, our households
are only moderately more rational than the benchmark of random choice; (ii) there are signi￿cant
di⁄erences in the rationality of di⁄erent groups, with multi-head households more rational than
1See for example Koo [1963], Varian [1982], Manser and McDonald [1988], Famulari [1995], Andreoni and Miller
[2002], Choi, Gale, Fisman, and Kariv [2007], Crawford and Pendakur [2008], Beatty and Crawford [2010], and
Echenique, Lee, and Shum [2010].
2Many of the proposed methods will be discussed brie￿ y below, but see Koo [1963], Afriat [1967], Varian [1982],
Houtman and Maks [1985], Famulari [1995], Gross [1995], Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler [2002], Hoderlein and Stoye
[2009], Echenique, Lee, and Shum [2010], and Apesteguia and Ballester [2011]. Varian [2006] provides an excellent
review.
3It should be noted that, while we describe households that do not behave as if they are maximizing a stable
utility function as being ￿ irrational￿ , this is really a linguistic shortcut. There are many reasons why a household
may appear to violate acyclicality which are perfectly sensible ￿for example due to preference shocks. Moreover, the
aggregation of goods into categories can introduce violations of acyclicality that were not in the original underlying
data. Essentially, we are testing whether consumption choices can be modeled as resulting from utility maximization,
not whether departures from this model are rational.
2single head households, and the youngest households more rational than middle age households;
(iii) the assumption of homogenous preferences is strongly rejected: choice data that is aggregated
across households exhibits high levels of irrationality.
The rationality measure we introduce is based on one proposed by Houtman and Maks [1985].
Their measure identi￿es the minimum number of observed choices that need to be removed from
a data set before the remaining data satis￿es acyclicality. While the Houtman-Maks measure has
a number of advantages,4 it has been criticized on the basis that it counts only the number of
violations of rationality, without taking into account the seriousness of these violations (Varian
[1991]). We therefore modify the Houtman-Maks measure to allow for revealed preference relations
to be of varying strengths, based on the cost di⁄erence between the chosen and unchosen item.
Thus, if bundle x is chosen when y is available for $100 less, the revealed preference for x over y is
￿ stronger￿than if x was chosen when y was available for $1 less. Our modi￿ed measure calculates
the lowest cost way of removing revealed preference observations such that the remaining data
satis￿es acyclicality, where the cost of removing a relation is equal to the strength of that relation.
We call this the HM-e¢ ciency (or HM-e) measure of rationality.
As with all rationality measures, the raw numbers provided by our index are uninformative on
their own, as they tell us nothing about the potential of a data set to demonstrate violations of
rationality. Consider, for example, a data set consisting of choices from disjoint choice sets. In this
case, any pattern of choice would be perfectly consistent with rationality, but the resulting ￿ perfect￿
index values would tell us nothing. We address this problem by including a novel adjustment for
the power of a data set to uncover irrationality. For a given measure of rationality, we de￿ne the
￿ Selten-Bronars￿score as the distance between the observed index values and the mean of simulated
values generated under the assumption of random choice, following the approaches suggested by
Bronars [1987], Selten [1991], and Beatty and Crawford [Forthcoming].
We apply our measure to a large balanced panel of consumption data. This ￿ Homescan￿data set
records the prices and quantities of all packaged food and beverage purchases made in any grocery
store, convenience store, discount store, or drug store for a sample of 977 households over a period of
24 months.5 Our results initially look promising for the hypothesis of utility maximization because
4Most notably its robustness to small numbers of errors, and its applicability to a wide range of data sets.
5Previously used by Aguiar and Hurst [2007]. Point-of-sale scanner data from a single store chain is used by
Echenique et al. [2010].
3deviations from full rationality seem small in absolute terms: we ￿nd that on average it is only
necessary to remove revealed preference relations equal to 0.16% of a household￿ s total expenditures
to make the remaining data set consistent with acyclicality, and the maximum amount that needs
to be removed for any household is just 2.68%. However, our comparison with the benchmark of
random choice indicates that a seemingly small absolute index value does not necessarily imply a
high level of rationality: on average, households facing the same budget sets as our households, but
who chose at random from the budget line, would have an average HM-e index of 0.45%. Thus,
while the households we observe are more rational that those that choose at random, the di⁄erence
is not large.
We ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences in rationality between demographic groups. Single head house-
holds are signi￿cantly less rational than those with multiple household heads. This result seems
to run contrary to the predictions of collective models of intra-household allocation (see Cherchye,
De Rock, Sabbe, and Vermeulen [2008]). We also ￿nd some evidence that the youngest households
(under 40) are more rational than middle age households (40 to 59 years old). This result is com-
patible with the ￿nding Choi, Kariv, M￿ller, and Silverman [2011] that younger people tend to
make more consistent choices.
Finally, we ￿nd strong evidence against the hypothesis that households have homogenous pref-
erences. When we pool together the choices of 30 di⁄erent households, we ￿nd that the level of
rationality is reduced dramatically. Approximately 12% of expenditure has to be removed in order
to make the resulting data set consistent with rationality. This is substantially larger than the
8.12% on average that must be removed from a pool of simulated random households. In contrast,
when we apply our methods to the household consumption data used by Blundell, Browning, and
Crawford [2008] (henceforth BBC)6 we do not ￿nd strong evidence of heterogeneity. The BBC
data is less ￿nely aggregated than the Homescan data we use, which may explain the di⁄erence in
results.
Our paper makes two further contributions to the literature on goodness of ￿t measures for
rationality. First, we introduce an algorithm for calculating measures of the Houtman-Maks type.
Like the Houtman-Maks measure, our new measure can be very computationally intensive.7;8 In
6This data is generated from the British Family Expenditure Survey.
7In fact, like the Houtman-Maks measure itself, the calculation of our measure is NP-hard.
8See Choi et al. [2007] for a case in which this constraint is binding in a data set consisting of only 50 choices.
4order to overcome this problem, we take advantage of the fact the calculation of the HM-e (and
HM) index can be translated into a form that is soluble by existing numerical solvers, a method
orders of magnitude more powerful than techniques currently used in economics.9 This method
can be applied to the HM-e index, the standard Houtman-Maks measure, and can be used to
approximate the minimal multiple rationale measure of Kalai et al. [2002]. Second, we compare
existing rationality measures to our new measure and to each other. We ￿nd a high degree of
correlation between measures: in all pairwise comparisons, Spearman￿ s rank correlation coe¢ cient
is never below 0.80. However, we ￿nd di⁄erences where we would expect. Our new measure, which
shares features of both the Afriat and Houtman-Maks measures, is more highly correlated with the
Afriat and Houtman-Maks measures (0.91 and 0.84 respectively), than they are with each other
(0.80). The same pattern also holds true if we look at the Selten-Bronars scores for each measure.
This result suggests that our new measure may provide a useful compromise between measures that
only count the number of violations of rationality and those that look only at the severity of those
violations.
Section 2 describes the HM-e index in detail. Section 3 applies our measure to the Homescan
data. Section 4 places our work in the context of the existing literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Measure of Rationality
Since the pioneering work of Samuelson [1938] and Houthakker [1950], the observable implications
of utility maximization have been well known: the (strict) preference relations revealed10 by choice
must be acyclic.11 This condition provides a simple, elegant, and nonparametric way of testing
9Our comparators are the methods used in Choi et al. [2007] and Houtman [1995].
10There are di⁄erent approaches to exactly what choice behavior reveals about preference. A standard assumption
that x is revealed strictly preferred to y when x is chosen and y is available. When considering choices from budget
sets, a weaker assumption is that x is revealed strictly preferred to y if x is chosen when y is available at a strictly
lower cost.
11If we observe choices from subsets of some grand set Z, and the binary relation ￿ on Z represents the (strict)
preferences revealed by those choices, acyclicality means that there exists no sequence z1; z2, :::, zn in Z such that
z1 ￿ z2 ￿ ::: ￿ zn ￿ z1.
If the data set is ￿nite, this acyclicality condition guarantees the existence of a utility function on Z that represents
the revealed preference relation, and so choice.
5whether a data set is in line with utility maximization.12 Unfortunately, it is of only limited use in
practice, as it provides no information as to whether a data set that contains revealed preference
cycles is ￿ close￿to satisfying rationality. A single mistaken choice is enough to declare an entire
data set incompatible with rationality, even if all other choices could be explained as resulting from
utility maximization. In practice, almost all data sets contain some revealed preference cycles.13
It is therefore important to have some measure of the extent of these violations, allowing us to
compare degrees of irrationality across individuals or decision making circumstances.
We introduce a new measure of rationality which is related to one proposed by Houtman and
Maks [1985]. The Houtman-Maks (henceforth HM) index is based on the smallest number of
observations that need to be removed for the remaining data to satisfy acyclicality. The number
reported as the ￿ HM index￿is the largest number of observations that are jointly acyclic, divided
by the total number of observations. It provides a natural measure of rationality that has two
big advantages. First, it can be applied to any form of choice data (and not just choices from
budget sets). Second, it is robust in the face of a small number of irrational choices (an issue we
return to below). However, it also has a weakness as a measure of rationality: it looks only at the
number of violations that need to be removed, not the severity of these violations. If a consumer￿ s
preference cycles only involve objects choices that are very close to indi⁄erence, or involve only
small cost di⁄erences, then we may not ￿nd those violations very damning to the concept of utility
maximization.
This shortcoming is easiest to illustrate in the case in which the observed choices are over bundles
of commodities from di⁄erent budget sets. Consider the following choice behavior for hypothetical
consumers A and B from budget sets in a commodity space that contains two goods (x and y):
￿ Budget set 1 : income is 10, price of good x is 2, price of good y is 2
￿A buys 1 unit of good x and 4 units of good y
￿B buys 2 units of good x and 3 units of good y
￿ Budget set 2 : income is 10, price of good x is 3, price of good y is 1
12It is also easy to implement using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm.
13For example, Choi et al. [2007] report that 83% of subjects violated GARP, and Cherchye et al. [2008] ￿nd that
55% of households fail the (unitary) test of GARP.
6￿A buys 3 unit of good x and 1 unit of good y
￿B buys 3 unit of good x and 1 units of good y
Figure 1 illustrates the choices of these two consumers.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Both of these consumers violate acyclicality, as in both cases the bundle bought in budget set
2 was available in budget set 1, and vice versa. However, the ￿ cost￿ 14 of the acyclicality violation
for consumer A is higher than for consumer B. For A, the bundle chosen from budget set 2 was
available at a cost of $8 from budget set 1, while the bundle chosen in budget set 1 was available
for $7. For consumer B, the bundle chosen from set 1 was available at a cost of $9 in set 2, while
the bundle chosen in set 2 was available for $8 in set 1. One could therefore think of the minimum
￿ cost￿the acyclicality violation for A is $2, while for B it is only $1. Yet both consumers would
have the same HM index.
In order to address the HM index￿ s inability to account for the severity of violations, we gener-
alize the measure to allow for the varying ￿ costs￿of removing di⁄erent revealed preference relations,
depending on an external metric for the strength of each preference. These costs are represented
by a weighting function, which carries information on the strength of di⁄erent revealed preference
relations. In general, any arbitrary weighting function could be used ￿in other words the weighting
function is an input to rather than an output of the index. However, as we illustrate with the above
example, in the case of choice of budget sets, one natural measure would be the cost di⁄erence be-
tween the chosen and unchosen bundle. So, if bundle x was chosen when bundle y was available
for $5 less, then the weight applied to the revealed preference of x over y would be 5.
The HM-e index is de￿ned as the lowest cost way of removing all the cycles from the data
according to this weighting function, divided by total expenditure.15 Thus, the HM-e index bridges
the gap between rationality measures that only count the number of violations of rationality and
those that look only at the cost, severity, or seriousness of such violations (Afriat [1972] and Varian
[1991]).
14Here cost can be thought of as a potential ￿ money pump￿or as ￿ wasted￿income.
15See the online appendix for a formal de￿nition of the HM-e index.
7One issue with both the HM and the HM-e index is computational complexity. Both problems
are NP-hard,16 and the di¢ culty of calculating indices of this type have often been binding in
practice.17 In the online appendix to this paper, we introduce an algorithm for ￿nding the size of
the largest subset of a choice data set that is consistent with acyclicality.18 We call this problem
the maximal acyclical set problem, or MASP. The key to our approach is to take advantage the fact
that MASP is equivalent to the minimum set covering problem (MSCP),19 which is well studied
in the computer sciences and operations research literature. While the MSCP is also NP-hard,
there are a wide variety of methods that are extremely e¢ cient in solving it for practical cases and
are included in standard ￿ solver￿software packages (see Caprara, Toth, and Fischetti [2000]). For
any choice data set, we can therefore translate the associated MASP into an equivalent MSCP,
which can then be solved using one of these software packages.20 In tests on simulated data, our
algorithm can handle data sets about an order of magnitude larger than methods currently used
in economics.21 Furthermore, because these solvers allow for the type of weighting function used
in the HM-e index, they can also be used to calculate this index as well. As a result, our algorithm
allows us to apply the HM-e index to the Homescan data we use in section 3 in ways that would
be impossible using existing methods.
One natural question is how the HM-e index relates to other measures, both theoretically and
practically. In order to discuss both these issues at the same time, we will delay this discussion
until after presenting our results.
2.1 Power
One issue with rationality measures is that it can be hard to interpret what a particular value tells
us about the underlying data. For example, consider a data set in which we observe choices from
two disjoint choice sets. In this case the HM-e index will be 0 for any observed pattern of choice.
16This means that there is no known algorithm with solution times that are certain to only increase polynomially
with the number of choices or revealed preference relations.
17See Choi et al. [2007] for an example in which the constraint is binding with only 50 choices.
18A usable version of our algorithm is available at https://￿les.nyu.edu/djm431/public/software.
19As shown in Garey and Johnson [1979].
20O⁄ the shelf algorithms for solving MSCP are included in many software packages that perform optimization
(such as Matlab). More powerful solvers are available for free over the Internet (such as SCIP, GLPK and MINTO)
or are available commercially (such as CPLEX).
21Our two comparators are the methodology applied by Choi et al. [2007] (henceforth CGFK) and Houtman [1995].
8In other words, such a data set o⁄ers no meaningful test of rationality. One way to address this
shortcoming is to compare the values of the HM-e index in the data to the distribution of values
we would see under some alternative ￿ null hypothesis￿for behavior. Such a comparison allows one
to determine whether observed behavior shows more, less, or similar levels of rationality than the
null hypothesis.
One popular benchmark is to compare index values to those that one would expect to see under
uniformly random choice, where in each choice set individuals have an equal chance of choosing
any object in the choice set.22 Although random choice is a relatively weak null hypothesis, it is
applicable to almost any choice setting.23 The role of random choice in determining the statistical
power of rationality measures is discussed by Bronars [1987] and is applied to Selten￿ s measure of
predictive success by Beatty and Crawford [Forthcoming]. While we base most of our analyses on
this benchmark, we also perform a robustness check using a benchmark in which budget shares
are drawn at random from the observed distribution of budget shares across all households and
budget sets. Thus, with this alternative benchmark, the simulated household has an equal chance
of choosing any observed budget shares, rather than any feasible budget shares.
Once we have selected and generated a benchmark, the next question is how to compare the
actual data to this benchmark. For a joint test of all consumers, one can compare the distribution
of the index values in the data with the distribution of index values generated under the null
hypothesis using some nonparametric measure of the di⁄erence between distributions (such as the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). In the case of a single observation, one can simply read o⁄the percentile
of the simulated data in which that observation falls. Another intuitive approach is to subtract the
average simulated value from the actual value ￿in the style of Selten￿ s measure of predictive success
[1991]. We refer to this adjustment, which combines elements of predictive power and statistical
power tests, as the ￿ Selten-Bronars￿score.
22Or, in the case of budget sets, an equal chance of choosing any bundle on the budget line.
23Alternatively, we could generate a distribution of possible index values for a given choice environment using a
more plausible error model or decision rule. For example, see Choi et al. [2007] and Andreoni and Harbaugh [2006].
93 Testing for Rationality in Scanner Data
We now apply our measure to a set of consumption data collected by the marketing ￿rm ACNeilson.
We analyze purchases of packaged foods and beverages for a balanced panel of 977 representative
households in the Denver metropolitan area over two years (February 1993 to February 1995).
These records are derived from the data set used in Aguiar and Hurst [2007], in which partici-
pating households document the Universal Product Code (UPC), price, date, store, and shopper
characteristics for all packaged grocery transactions that occur across retail outlets. In addition,
households maintain detailed demographic information that is updated annually (see the appendix
of Aguiar and Hurst [2007] for a more complete description of the data).
From the initial data set, which included purchases from 2,100 households, we kept those house-
holds that participated for the entire 24 month period and had at least one purchase in every month.
For the remaining 977 households, we have an average of 20.5 purchases and 7 store trips per month.
Table 1 summarizes the demographics of our sample households.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
In our baseline data set, we aggregate purchases at the monthly level, to alleviate concerns
about the fact that some items are storable. Because the data set includes packaged food and
beverage transactions for 11,517 UPC codes, it is necessary to de￿ne product categories and create
price indices for each category. We place products into one of three categories: beverages, meals,
and snacks. The full data set contains price information on 384,964 beverage purchases, 307,391
meal purchases, and 132,499 snack purchases. We examine the e⁄ect of both of these aggregation
assumptions in section 3.1.1 below.
It should be noted that for utility maximization to imply acyclicality of revealed preference
relations in this data set requires further assumptions. First, food and beverages must be additively
separable in the utility function from utility for other goods and services. This assumption is strong,
but standard in the literature (see for example Echenique et al. [2010]).
We also implicitly assume that, in any given period, all households face the same price for each
product category as we use the same price index for all households. It is necessary to make this
assumption because not all goods were bought in all periods by all households, even with just three
10product categories, and if a price is missing in a month, then it is not possible to do standard
revealed preference testing.24 Thus, if we had chosen to use a household speci￿c price index, it
would have restricted our attention to only those households with complete price information for
the entire period, resulting in a loss almost 85% of households.25
Because prices do vary within the period and among stores, the assumption of a single price
per good per period could introduce error. However, this limitation is also present when using
most standard price indices, including the CPI, so it is common to papers that conduct revealed
preference tests using standard price indices (such as Blundell, Browning, Crawford [2003]). We
use a Stone price index in our primary analyses, but later compare our results to those obtained
using other methods: Torvist, Laspeyres, and Paasche (see online appendix for further details).
3.1 Are People Rational?
Our ￿rst task is to apply our the HM-e index to ￿nd out how close the households in our baseline
data set are to satisfying acyclicality. Table 2 summarizes the results of our tests.26
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The HM-e score reported in table 2 suggests that, in absolute terms, the behavior of households
in our baseline sample is close to that of the paradigmatic rational agent. While only 31% of
households have choices that are perfectly in line with rationality, the average cost of preference
relations that need to be removed to make the data set consistent with rationality is very small:
about 0.16% of total expenditure. There is signi￿cant variation across households in their absolute
degree of rationality: the maximum HM-e index we ￿nd is 2.68% of total expenditure. The top
panel of ￿gure 2 shows the distribution of HM-e index values in our sample population.
24Alternatively, we could use the approach detailed in Blundell, Browning, and Crawford [2008], in which the
standard GARP test is weakened to allow for missing price data, but this test does not measure the degree of
violation for a household.
25We also attempted to create a price index for each household by using average prices in the stores where each
household made its purchases. However, the households are spread across Denver in such a way that there is little
overlap in the stores visited.
26Note that we are treating the unit of analysis here as an individual household: we calculate the index value for
each household, then average across these values.
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These raw values; however, tell us little about whether these results should be considered as
providing strong support for the model of individual rationality ￿so far we know nothing of the
power of this data set to identify irrational choice. In order to answer this question, we employ the
Selten-Bronars score (power adjustment) introduced in section 2.1 to the HM-e index. We calculate
this score at the household level using the 24 budget sets actually faced by that household. For
each budget set, we generate a ￿ choice￿as a random bundle on the budget line. We then calculate
the HM-e index for these 24 simulated choices. This procedure is repeated 50 times to create a
distribution of index values generated under random choice for that particular household. For a
given index and household, we describe as the Selten-Bronars score the index value recorded by the
household minus the mean index value of the simulated data.
The ￿ Selten Bronars￿column of table 2 reports the average Selten-Bronars score across house-
holds for the HM-e index. This suggests that, while our consumers do on average outperform the
simulated random data, they do not do so to a great degree. On average, our simulated random
choosers required removals totaling around 0.45% of total expenditure to achieve rationality, giving
a Selten-Bronars score of -0.29%.
Thus, while the data generated by our households seem ￿ close￿to rationality, random choosers
also look relatively close to rationality ￿ a result consistent with that of Beatty and Crawford
[2010] and Echenique et al. [2010]. Of course, it could be that while the mean index values for the
simulated random choosers seem close to those of those of the actual households, it is very unlikely
for random choosers to reach the values of our actual households. In other words, the variance of
the index values of the simulated choosers could be small relative to the gap in means between
simulated and actual values. To test this hypothesis, we calculate for each household the percentile
of simulated values that the household index falls into ￿in other words, the proportion of simulated
households that are no more rational that the actual household.
The ￿ percentile￿column of table 2 reports the average of these percentiles across households.
This measure supports the hypothesis that our observed households are on average more rational
than the random benchmark, but not dramatically so: the average percentile for our households
is 73. Further evidence that the behavior of random choosers is similar to that of our baseline
population can be seen in ￿gure 2. The bottom panel of the graph shows the distribution of index
12values from the simulated data for all households. While this distribution is statistically di⁄erent
to those generated by the households in our sample (at the 1% level using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test), the di⁄erences are not stark.
Note that this data set does have the power to identify irrational choice: on average only about
10% of our simulated households exhibit perfect acyclicality. Rather, what this result tells us is
that a HM-e index of (for example) 0.5% would in fact reveal quite a lot about the underlying
rationality for most households: even someone who was choosing at random along the budget line
would not expect to have an HM-e index so high.
3.1.1 Robustness Checks
We provide a series of robustness checks on our results. In other words, we examine the extent to
which the assumptions described at the start of section 3 a⁄ect our conclusions. First, we examine
whether the number of product categories into which we aggregate goods matters for our results.
To do so, we repeat our analysis, but rather than use the three aggregate product categories of
our baseline data, we use the 38 product categories available in the Homescan data. These results
are shown in the second line of table 2. The value of the HM-e index for our households is little
changed (0.18%, as compared to 0.16% in the baseline data). However, the amount of rationality
observed in the simulations changes dramatically: at the 38 product level, there are extremely
few violations of rationality in the random choice data. This means that the household data is
on average less rational that the simulated data at this level of disaggregation, as indicated by a
positive Selten-Bronars score: the average cost of removing irrationality from the random data is
only 0.01%, giving a Selten-Bronars score of 0.17%.
The lack of irrationality in the random choice data re￿ ects the fact that, with 38 product
categories, the regions of the budget lines that can generate violations of GARP are small (in the
sense of Beatty and Crawford [2010]). So why do we not observe high levels of rationality in the
actual household data? The answer appears to be that households do not buy all 38 products in
each month. On average, households consumed products from just 8.2 categories in a month. Thus,
they are often at a ￿ corner￿of the budget set. This suggests that random simulations (which almost
never hit the corner of the budget set) are not a suitable benchmark in this case. We address this
concern below when we use an alternative distribution to generate our comparison simulations.
13As a second robustness check, we run our analysis on data temporally aggregated at the 2
week level, rather than the monthly level. The results are shown in line 3 of table 2. There is
some evidence that data at this level contains more serious violations of rationality than does our
baseline case. Almost no households are perfectly rational, and the HM-e index is higher than
in the baseline case (0.48% rather than 0.16%). However, notice that in this case we observing
48 choices instead of 24 as in the baseline case, so consumers have more opportunities to exhibit
irrationality. The fact that the Selten-Bronars score and mean percentile are relatively similar to
that of the baseline case suggests that the larger sample size is driving much of the increase in
measured rationality.
Next we try a number a di⁄erent price indices (Torvist, Laspeyres, and Paasche) and compare
these to the baseline case in which we use the Stone price index. These results are reported in
lines 4-6 of table 2. In terms of raw value of the HM-e index, the data based on di⁄erent price
indices splits into two di⁄erent groups: the Stone and Paasche indices give very similar results, as
do the Torvist and the Laspeyres, with the former giving raw HM-e scores that are roughly double
those of the latter. This grouping makes sense because the Stone and Paasche indices use a basket
of goods that changes in each period based on expenditure in that period, while the Torvist and
the Laspeyres indices use a more stable basket of goods based in part on expenditure in the ￿rst
period.
Line 7 of table 2 reports the results if we use data collected only from purchases made from the
largest chain store in the sample. This makes little di⁄erence to our results.
As a ￿nal robustness check, we use an alternative benchmark. Rather than using choices that
are drawn from a uniform random distribution on the budget line, we draw budget shares for each
category of goods from the observed distribution of shares across all households and budget sets.
The results for the baseline data set are shown on the 8th line of table 2. They show that our
consumers are somewhat more rational relative to this benchmark than to the uniformly random
benchmark (on average our households fall in the 79th percentile of the simulated distribution,
compared to the 73rd percentile with the baseline benchmark). This suggests that the empirical
distribution of budget shares is concentrated in regions that are more likely to cause violations of
rationality than is the uniform distribution. However, the e⁄ect is not dramatic.
On the other hand, the clustering of budget shares in the empirical distribution has a dramatic
14e⁄ect when considering all 38 product categories. With this benchmark, the Selten-Bronars score
becomes negative, meaning that on average, actual index values are lower than the benchmark
scores. Further, the mean percentile is similar to the baseline data set with the same benchmark.
Thus, this alternative benchmark appears to be more appropriate when considering a large number
of product categories.
3.2 Are Some People More Rational than Others?
We next examine to what extent demographic variables can explain di⁄erences in the level of
rationality between households. We do this by regressing the HM-e index value and Selten-Bronars
score for each household on demographic variables available in the Homescan data: whether there
is a child in the household, the number of household heads, the number of regular shoppers in
the household, the age of household heads, the income bracket of the household, and whether a
household head graduated from college.27 Table 3 reports the results of this regression.
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The dependent variable that we are most interested in is the Selten-Bronars score for each
household, rather than the raw HM-e index. This is important because there might be systematic
di⁄erences between groups in the power of the rationality measures. For example, di⁄erent income
groups might have di⁄erent numbers of crossing budget lines. This could lead to di⁄erences in the
underlying indices that have nothing to do with di⁄erences in the rationality of these groups.
The most interesting result from the regression analysis regards the rationality of households
with a single head. A signi￿cant literature has developed to examine the conditions under which
aggregation of preferences within the household can lead to ￿ irrational￿choices at the household level
(see for example Cherchye et al. [2008]). Intuitively, in multi-person households, di⁄erent household
members may have di⁄erent preferences. Depending on how these preferences are aggregated, this
may lead to cyclic choice behavior at the household level. Thus, we would expect single person
households to be more rational than multi-person households. In fact, we ￿nd precisely the opposite:
households with a single head have Selten-Bronars scores that are higher than those of multi-person
27When the Selten-Bronars measure is the dependent variable, we use standard OLS regression. When the raw
HM-e index is the dependent variable, we use a Tobit regression due to censoring at 0.
15households. These di⁄erences are signi￿cant both statistically (at the 0.1% level) and economically
￿single households waste 0.11% more of their income relative to the random benchmark than do
multi-head households. This suggests either that intra-head bargaining is not an important cause
of irrational choices, or that there is some unobserved factor a⁄ecting single head households that
makes them more prone to irrationality. We also ￿nd no evidence that households in which multiple
people do the shopping show any more irrationality than those in which a single person does the
shopping.
We also ￿nd signi￿cant e⁄ects of age on rationality. Interestingly, the relationship appears not
to be linear. Households with ￿ young￿(under 40) household heads are more rational than those
with heads in the middle range (signi￿cant at the 5% level). This is in line with other results in the
literature (e.g. Choi et al. 2011). However, older (over 65) households also seem to be somewhat
more rational than middle age households, though this is only signi￿cant at the 12% level. This
result is more puzzling, though it is compatible with the result of Aguiar and Hurst [2007] that
seniors invest more time and e⁄ort in shopping.
The results on the relationship between income and rationality show the importance of using
the Selten-Bronars score, rather than the raw index values. While we ￿nd a signi￿cant relationship
between income group and raw value, this relationship disappears when the dependent variable is
the Selten-Bronars score. This suggests that the di⁄erences in the raw values are being driven by
the ability of the di⁄erent data sets to demonstrate irrational behavior, rather than any di⁄erence
in irrationality by the di⁄erent households.
Finally, we ￿nd no relationship between rationality and either education or the presence of a
child in the household.
3.3 Aggregation and Homogeneous Preferences
We next turn to the question of whether individual households can be aggregated together under
the assumption of homogeneous preferences. Note that there are two related, but di⁄erent issues
here. First, one could ask whether, if we sum up all the demands coming from the individual
households, the resulting aggregate demand satis￿es acyclicality.28 Second, we could ask whether
28In line with the work of Varian [1982], Bronars [1987], and Houtman and Maks [1985], we ￿nd that aggregated
data appears extremely rational in absolute terms, even when the underlying data is not so, and that the power of
16it is appropriate to assume that all households are maximizing the same set of preferences, in order
to treat (for example) 24 monthly observations from 30 households as if they were 720 observations
from the same household. In this section, we concentrate on the latter question, which is addressed
in the work of Hoderlein and Stoye [2010], and is of importance (for example) in the estimating of
cost-of-living changes (Blundell, Browning and Crawford [2003, 2008]).
In order to test the assumption of homogeneity, we examine the 30 individuals (single person
households) who are under the age of 40 and are employed.29 Treated as separate households, this
group exhibits average levels of rationality similar to those of our baseline sample.30
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Table 4 shows the rationality measures applied to the pooled data. The results unambiguously
show that these individuals cannot be aggregated under the assumption of homogeneous preferences.
The HM-e index is almost 12%, which is higher than all of the values produced by 50 random choice
simulations, resulting in a positive Selten-Bronars score.
One natural question is whether it is possible to aggregate consumers together along demo-
graphic lines. In the preceding sample, we have already controlled for household composition (no
children, single head, 1 primary shopper), age, and to some degree, income level. Even with these
controls, the pooled data still exhibits substantial irrationality. Table 4 also shows our rationality
measures when the consumers are further restricted to just female consumers (15 consumers) or
male consumers (15 consumers). For female consumers in this sample, the assumption of homo-
geneity appears to be a reasonable one (they are in the 90th percentile of random choices), but for
male consumers the assumption is still strongly rejected.
such rationality tests is very low.
29Treating these 30 individuals as a single entity gives 30 times 24, or 720 choices. Given the density of revealed
preference information in our data set, this is approximately the largest number of choices for which our algorithm
can work in reasonable time. In contrast, competing algorithms such as those of Houtman [1995], can handle choice
sets of fewer than 100 observations.
30On average, an HM-e index of 0.11%, a Selten-Bronars score of -0.25, and an HM-e index in the 73rd percentile
of the random distribution.
174 Comparison to Previous Work
4.1 Other Measures of Rationality - Theory
The existing literature includes many other measures of how close a data set is to satisfying ra-
tionality. In this section, we begin by discussing how these measures relate to the HM-e index in
theory. We then compare these measures in practice, by comparing the results they give for our
data set.
One of the earliest measures of rationality was provided by Afriat [1967], which uses the concept
of ￿ revealed preferred at e¢ ciency level e￿ : if bundle x is chosen when y was available at a fraction
e of the cost of x then x is preferred to y at e¢ ciency level e. Afriat￿ s measure is the largest e￿
such that there are no preference cycles revealed at that e¢ ciency level. Apesteguia and Ballester
[2010] point out one problem with the Afriat measure ￿that it looks only at the worst violation
of rationality, ignoring all others. Thus, a single bad choice can make the Afriat index arbitrarily
small. Varian [1991] suggested modifying the Afriat index to allow for di⁄erent e¢ ciency levels
for di⁄erent budget sets. The Varian index is therefore a vector of e¢ ciency levels, one for each
observed choice, that removes all preference cycles related to that choice. Varian suggests ￿nding
such a vector that maximizes the smallest et, and then using this value as a summary statistic.
While this value is relatively easy to compute, it is also not robust to a single bad choice.31
A second class of rationality measures are exempli￿ed by the counting measure suggested by
Famulari [1995]. This measure counts the number of times that GARP is violated (i.e. the number
x￿ s and y￿ s such that x is indirectly revealed preferred to y, but y is revealed preferred to x). As
with the Afriat index, this measure is not robust, in the sense that a single choice can lead to
a large change in the value of the index because it can create many new cycles. Furthermore, it
contains no metric of how ￿ severe￿is a violation of GARP. This ￿nal issue is corrected by the ￿ money
pump￿measure of Echenique et al. [2010], which counts up the total cost of all violations of GARP
in a data set. This measure is closest in spirit to our HM-e index and shares its computational
complexity. However, this measure can also be susceptible to big e¢ ciency losses due to a single
bad choice.32
31Alternative summary statistics based on the Varian vector of e¢ ciencies are robust ￿for example the minimal
absolute distance of this from the unit vector. However, this measure is very complicated to compute.
32The di⁄erence between the money pump and the HM-e measures can be illustrated in the following example.
18A third approach to constructing measures of rationality is taken by Apesteguia and Ballester
[2010]. They provide axiomatic foundations for a class of rationality indices they call ￿ weighted loss
indices￿ . Though similar in spirit, the HM-e index does not fall into the class of weight loss indices
as it violates the composition axiom.33
A di⁄erent window into rationality is provided by the ￿ rationalization by multiple rationales￿
(RMR) measure, which is based on the idea that agents can have di⁄erent rationales for di⁄erent
states. For example, the relative ranking of an umbrella and a bicycle may di⁄er depending on
whether it is raining or not. If we do not observe these di⁄erent states, then the resulting choices
may appear irrational. This notion was captured by Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler [2002], who
introduced the concept of rationalization by multiple rationales. A rationale is a preference ordering,
and a data set is rationalized by a collection of rationales if all observations are explicable as the
maximization of one of the rationales. Thus, choice data that can be rationalized by n rationales
can be thought of as being generated by an individual who at any time is in one of n di⁄erent ￿ states￿
and in each state has a di⁄erent set of preferences. Such an approach has also been applied to the
analysis of household level data, to determine if household choices can be rationalized as preference
maximization by one of the members of the household (Deb [2008], Nobibon et al. [2011]) and to
determine if households are heterogeneous (Crawford and Pendakur [2010]).
4.2 Other Measures of Rationality ￿Practice
Clearly, the various measures described above can provide di⁄erent answers as to how rational are
individuals based on the same set of choices. However, it remains an open question as to whether
these di⁄erences are important in practice. In this section, we redo the analysis of section 3.1 with
our baseline data set, but using four alternative measures of rationality: the HM, RMR, Afriat, and
Famulari measures.34 Table 5 repeats our analysis of the baseline data set using these measures.
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Say that bundle x was chosen when y was available for $10 less, y was chosen when z was available for $10 less, and
z was chosen when x was available for 5c / less. The money pump measure of Echenique et al. [2010] would say the
cost of this cycle was $20.05, whereas the HM-e measure would say the cost was 5c /. Thus, a single observation can
lead to very large costs according to the money pump metric.
33Though the HM-e index satis￿es the other axioms in the paper.
34We do not use the money pump measure of Echenique et al. [2010] due to computational complexity.
19Broadly speaking, these alternative measures give the same impression of the rationality of our
agents as does the HM-e index: violations from rationality exhibited by our households are small
in absolute terms, but are not far from those exhibited by households that choose randomly. The
average (normalized) HM index for our households is about 95%, meaning that on average the
maximal acyclical set contains about 95% of all observed choices. This is about 4% larger than
the size of the set for random choosers. The average RMR for our households is 1.73,35 meaning
that they generally need only a small number of rationales to explain their choices (the maximal
number of rationales we ￿nd for our households is 3). The average Afriat index is around 99%,
meaning that there is around a 1% loss of e¢ ciency on average, with a 2% average e¢ ciency loss
for random choosers. Finally, the Famulari index is 0.70, meaning that the percentage of revealed
preferences that are involved in cycles is just 0.7%. This compares to a violation rate of 1.65% for
random choosers.
We also perform the regression analysis of table 3 using these 4 alternative rationality measures.
Again, the broad message is similar across the measures. In all cases, single person households are
less rational according to both the raw measure and the Selten-Bronars score. In most cases, income
is signi￿cant in the raw score, but not in the Selten-Bronars score (the one exception being the HM
index Selten-Bronars score, in which higher income is related to less rationality). The relationship
between age and rationality is not present for all measures: the ￿ hump￿shape relationship between
age and rationality is also observed in the Famulari measure, but not in the HM, RMR, or Afriat
measures.
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Table 6 shows Spearman￿ s rank correlations between the various measures across households.36
All measures provide very similar rankings over households: none of the various measures we look
at have rank correlations below 0.80. However, the degree of correlation does vary between the
measures ￿ranging between 0.80 (the Afriat and the HM measures) and 0.91 (the Afriat and HM-e
measures). The fact that the HM-e index is more correlated with each of these measures than they
35Our algorithm for calculating the RMR is an approximation that provides only an upper bound on the number
of rationales needed.
36For this comparison, these measures have been normalized so that a higher value of the measure is always less
rational.
20are with each other con￿rms that the HM-e index is ￿ in between￿the pure counting measures (HM
index and Famulari) and the ￿ severity￿measures (Afriat).37
4.3 Previous Tests of Rationality
There is a small existing literature that tests the degree of rationality in laboratory and ￿eld
settings. Crawford and Pendakur [2010] estimate the RMR index for a cross section of data on
milk demand. They ￿nd that the 500 households in their survey can be explained by either 4
or 5 types. This is compatible with our ￿nding on homogeneity ￿even though one type may be
a bad assumption, a small number of types fully rationalizes the data. Echenique et al. [2010]
examine rationality in a data set similar to ours. They conclude that, while violations of GARP
are common, the cost of these violations is relatively low. They also point out that the power
of these tests is low, but come to the conclusion that this is because the random benchmark is
unsuitable. They also ￿nd that younger, richer, better educated, and larger households have higher
rationality values. Our study di⁄ers from theirs primarily in that (a) we focus on power-adjusted
measures rather than raw values and (b) we also examine the question of whether consumers can
be pooled together under the assumption of homogeneous preferences. Choi et al. [2011] collected
experimental data on choices over lotteries from a panel of 2000 Dutch subjects. They found that
rationality was signi￿cantly higher in their subjects than under the random benchmark. They also
found signi￿cant di⁄erences in rationality between demographic groups: with high income, high
education, male, and younger subjects showing higher levels of consistency. Hoderlein [2010] takes
a somewhat di⁄erent approach, using techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity to test
integrability conditions using cross sectional data from the British Family Expenditure Survey. He
￿nds that the rationality assumption is acceptable for a large fraction of the population.
4.4 Homogeneity in the BBC Data
The substantial preference heterogeneity found using our Homescan data suggests that preference
heterogeneity may appear with other consumption data sets as well. In order to examine this
possibility, we repeat our analysis using a subset of the data from BBC.38 Table 7 shows the
37The same pattern emerges if we use Pearson￿ s correlation coe¢ cient.
38The authors use 25 years of data from the (annual) British Family Expenditure Survey. For each household,
consumption is aggregated into three categories: food, other nondurables, and services. Prices for each of these
21HM-e index and associated Selten-Bronars score (based on 50 simulations) if we pool together
all households in the greater London area from the BBC consumption data for the years 1993 to
1999. Unlike the Homescan data, we do not ￿nd evidence for severe preference heterogeneity across
households: the HM-e index of 0.922 is lower than the mean of the index values for simulated
data, resulting in a negative Selten-Bronars score. In fact, it is lower than all index values for
simulated data, placing the actual index value in the 100th percentile. Thus, using this metric, the
pooled households from the BBC data set are more rational than most of the individual households
from the Homescan data. This suggests that the degree of preference heterogeneity may not be
particularly large in the BBC data set.
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We speculate that the reason for the lower level of preference heterogeneity in the BBC is due
to a higher level of product aggregation. BBC aggregate to three categories: food and beverages,
other nondurable goods, and services. All goods in the Homescan data fall into the ￿rst of these
categories. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that preferences are more homogeneous
at higher levels of aggregation. Testing this assumption is clearly an avenue for further work.
5 Conclusion
We believe that the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we have applied the HM-e index
and importantly, the Selten Bronars measure, to a rich data set that tracks most packaged meal,
beverage, and snack purchases of a group of 977 households in the Denver area over a period of
two years. Our results show that while deviations from the predictions of utility maximization
are not costly in absolute terms, this is not necessarily an indication of high levels of rationality:
households that chose at random from the budget line would also not exhibit particularly costly
variations of rationality. This accounting for power is important for understanding ￿ true￿di⁄erences
in rationality. We do; however, ￿nd strong evidence against the assumption that households can be
treated as homogenous entities with the same preferences ￿an important point for welfare analysis.
Second, we have improved on the tools available to researchers who are interested in how close
categories are then calculated using the Retail Price Index, which is the same for all households in a given year.
22a data set is to satisfying rationality. The HM-e index o⁄ers a new measure of rationality that
combines elements of previous ￿ counting￿measures (Famulari [1985], Houtman and Maks [1985])
and ￿ severity￿measures (Afriat [1967]). When combined with the power adjustment we use, it
provides an robust picture of rationality for a set of choices. Moreover, the algorithm we use to
calculate the HM-e index is a signi￿cant improvement on those currently in use in economics,
and helps to overcome the issue of computational complexity that has plagued many rationality
measures (such as the HM and RMR indices).
An important avenue for future research would be to apply measures such as the HM-e index to
a broader class of data sets in order to determine more thoroughly (a) how far people￿ s consumption
choices are from utility maximization and (b) the source of these discrepancies. Our results show
that, in this data set, the costs of departures from rationality are small, but the Selten Bronars
score tells us we would not expect them to be very big. An important question is therefore whether,
in a data set which o⁄er a lot of scope for irrationality, we observe very costly deviations. Further-
more, given that there are many factors that could lead to cyclic choices in consumption data ￿
￿ true￿irrationality, preference shocks, changes in household composition, aggregation of prices and
quantities ￿it is clearly important to uncover what is leading to observed irrationality. A promising
avenue in this regard is the use of laboratory-style experiments in ￿eld settings, as demonstrated
by Choi et al. [2011].
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Baseline 977 31% 0.16 (0.26) ‐0.29 (0.35) 73 (29)
38 Products  977 25% 0.18 (0.30) 0.17 (0.30) 30 (42)
2 Week 397 1% 0.48 (0.52) ‐0.32 (0.61) 69 (29)
Torvist 977 31% 0.08 (0.13) ‐0.08 (0.15) 68 (31)
Laspayres 977 31% 0.08 (0.14) ‐0.08 (0.16) 67 (31)
Paasche 977 31% 0.16 (0.26) ‐0.29 (0.35) 73 (29)
Largest Chain 332 27% 0.24 (0.43) ‐0.28 (0.51) 70 (30)
Alternative Benchmark 977 31% 0.16 (0.26) ‐0.52 (0.43) 79 (24)








































                 
Pooled Data  1  720  11.98  3.86  0 
                 
Females  1  360  3.00 ‐ 1.18  90 














           
HM‐e  0.16 (0.26) ‐ 0.29 (0.35)  73 (29) 
           
HM  0.95 (0.04)  0.04 (0.05)  80 (25) 
RMR  1.73 (0.52) ‐ 0.29 (0.54)  89 (17) 
Afriat  0.99 (0.02)  0.01 (0.02)  73 (30) 










   HM‐e  HM  RMR  Afriat 
HM  0.84           
RMR  0.82  0.85    
Afriat  0.91  0.80  0.81    











                 
Pooled Data  1  893  0.922 ‐ 0.939  100 
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Units of good xFigure 2: Distribution of HM‐e index values (truncated at an HM‐e index of 1%) in the baseline population 
(top panel) and in a simulated population of random choosers (bottom panel) 
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